Emergence of despotic and egalitarian societies
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THEORY
Dominance interactions between group-living animal species are related with control of resources such as food, safe spatial locations and sexual partners. Despotic and egalitarian societies (based on different dominance styles) can be found in nature (insects, birds and primates). While in the former, these benefits (due to priority of access to resources) are strongly biased towards most dominant individuals, in the later they are more equally distributed.
It is generally considered by observation and analysis of the social behavior of different macaque species, that differences between despotic and egalitarian societies are a consequence of differences in the co-evolution of related social dispositions, such as, intensity of aggression and degree of nepotism (Thierry, 1985 and 1990). Hemelrijk (1999) shows however that these differences in social behavior can also arise in the absence of nepotism, due only to different potentials of spatial self-structuring that depend on different intensities of aggression. Higher intensity of aggression promotes dominance differentiation and a steeper hierarchy, which leads to the emergent phenomenon of spatial centrality of dominants because less dominants flee to the periphery of the group but never too far since the group provides safety. This in turn affects group cohesiveness, decreases frequency of interactions and feeds back dominance differentiation. Dominance relations are thus self-reinforcing. A positive feedback loop system is established between spatial structure and hierarchy differentiation.
WHAT IS IT?
This model is inspired on the artificial life model of Hemelrijk, to simulate the complex system described. In this computational model of dominance and spatial structure, resources are not explicitly implemented but they are implicitly assumed as agents in a virtual world engage in competitive interactions whenever other agents are found in their personal space.
HOW IT WORKS
Agents can move in a toroidal virtual world (to avoid border effects) of size 51 x 51 spatial units. Their visual field is defined by an attentional angle (attentional-angle) and attentional-distance (maxview). The order in which agents act in the world is random, which is biologically plausible for small groups of agents as considered here by default. For much larger groups however a locally controlled activity sequence should also be implemented, in which agents act if they see any another agent acting in their visual field. Here to simplify, one time-step counts after all agents act in a random order.
Two opposing forces affect the group spatial structure: the agents are attracted to one another because being in the group provides safety, but aggregation implies competition for resources (individuals strive for higher ranks) which drives individuals apart. In this model, aggregation is defined by the grouping rules defined in Hemelrijk, C. K. (1999, January).
THINGS TO TRY
1) Setup and go with default settings and observe the plots and monitors.
2) Try different values of initdom and stepdom (eg: 8 and 0.1). Setup, go and observe the plots and monitors. In this case dominance values are much lower than in the former case and changes in dominance are much slower. This would be the case of a more egalitarian society.
CREDITS
The present model was coded by David N. Sousa. Feel free to contact.
REFERENCES
Hemelrijk, C. K. (1999, January). Emergence of despotic and egalitarian societies: an individual-oriented model for hypothesis generation on macaques. In AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY (pp. 148-149). DIV JOHN WILEY & SONS INC, 605 THIRD AVE, NEW YORK, NY 10158-0012 USA: WILEY-LISS.
Thierry, B. (1985). Social development in three species of macaque (Macaca mulatta, M. fascicularis, M. tonkeana): a preliminary report on the first ten weeks of life. Behavioural processes, 11(1), 89-95.
Thierry, B. (1990). Feedback loop between kinship and dominance: the macaque model. Journal of theoretical Biology, 145(4), 511-522.
Comments and Questions
globals[mean-feq-attacks mean-centrality dominance-differentiation] turtles-own[dominance win list-of-mean-distances current-mean-distance centrality n-attacks] to setup ca ask patches [set pcolor blue] crt n-turtles [set color white setxy (random-xcor / init-cohesion ) (random-ycor / init-cohesion ) set dominance initdom set list-of-mean-distances []] collect-data reset-ticks end to go ask turtles [activation-procedure] ask turtles [set color scale-color red dominance 0 ([dominance] of max-one-of turtles [dominance])] ask turtles [if color > 19.9 [set color yellow]] tick collect-data end to collect-data ask turtles [ set current-mean-distance mean [distance myself] of turtles set list-of-mean-distances fput current-mean-distance list-of-mean-distances set centrality mean list-of-mean-distances ] set mean-centrality mean [centrality] of turtles if not any? turtles with [n-attacks = 0] [ set mean-feq-attacks mean [n-attacks / ticks] of turtles] set dominance-differentiation standard-deviation [dominance] of turtles / mean [dominance] of turtles end to activation-procedure ifelse any? turtles-in perspace [interact][ ifelse any? turtles-in nearview [step 1][ ifelse any? turtles-in maxview [face one-of turtles-in maxview step 1][ set heading heading + (search-angle * ( - 1) ^ (random 2))]]] end to step [d] repeat 10 [fd d / 10] end to-report turtles-in [d] report other turtles in-cone d attentional-angle end to interact let target min-one-of turtles-in perspace [distance myself] let relative-dominance (dominance / (dominance + [dominance] of target)) attack target relative-dominance ifelse win = 1 [ attack target relative-dominance set n-attacks n-attacks + 1 move-after-attack target update-rank target relative-dominance ][ ;loosers-move ] end to attack [tgt rd] let rnd random-float 1 ifelse rd >= rnd [set win 1 ask tgt [set win 0]][set win 0 ask tgt [set win 1]] end to move-after-attack [tgt] ifelse win = 1 [winners-move ask tgt [loosers-move]] [loosers-move ask tgt [winners-move]] end to winners-move step 1 set heading heading + (45 * ( - 1) ^ (random 2)) end to loosers-move set heading (heading + 180 + (45 * ( - 1) ^ (random 2))) step flee-distance end to update-rank [tgt rd] set dominance dominance + stepdom * (win - rd) * ( - 1) ^ (abs (win - 1)) ask tgt [ set dominance dominance + stepdom * ([win] of myself - rd) * ( - 1) ^ (abs (win - 1)) ] ; correct null/negative dominance if dominance <= 0.001 [set dominance 0.001] ask tgt [if dominance <= 0.001 [set dominance 0.001]] end
There is only one version of this model, created almost 5 years ago by David Sousa.
Attached files
File | Type | Description | Last updated | |
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Emergence of despotic and egalitarian societies.png | preview | Preview for 'Emergence of despotic and egalitarian societies' | almost 5 years ago, by David Sousa | Download |
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